Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity¶
Harman, G., & Thomson, J. J. (1996). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Moral Relativism
- It is further distinct from the framework-internal vs framework-external view — relativism's core structural claim that cross-frame critique requires either stepping outside both frames (which relativism may forbid) or appealing to a meta-frame (which regresses infinitely).
This sourceHarman-Thomson Moral Relativism Objectivity truth-value relativization.
- It is further distinct from the framework-internal vs framework-external view — relativism's core structural claim that cross-frame critique requires either stepping outside both frames (which relativism may forbid) or appealing to a meta-frame (which regresses infinitely).
Verification¶
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