This sourceSurveys and compares voting/electoral systems as distinct aggregation rules (plurality, approval, Borda, Condorcet) and their strategic and Condorcet-efficiency properties.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The publisher abstract only contrasts approval voting with plurality voting and notes strategic-voting effects; it names no Borda, Condorcet, instant-runoff or range rule and never frames electoral design as social choice.
“Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate (rather than the strongest minority candidate, as often occurs under plurality voting), its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting”
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