Approval Voting

Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (1983). Approval Voting.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1983

DOI

10.1007/978-0-387-49896-6

ISBN

9780387498959

Link

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-49896-6

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Social Choice
  • Political voting: plurality, instant-runoff, approval, Borda, Condorcet, and range voting are different aggregation rules; electoral-system design is social choice applied to political decisions.

    This sourceSurveys and compares voting/electoral systems as distinct aggregation rules (plurality, approval, Borda, Condorcet) and their strategic and Condorcet-efficiency properties.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:b86fee1540d2 · see in the full table