The Paradox of Confirmation 1¶
Fitelson. (2006). The Paradox of Confirmation 1.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Domain-specific¶
- Hempel's Paradox
- Philosophy of science and inductive logic — the home turf: the canonical counterexample to naive hypothetico-deductive confirmation and the motivation for moving from qualitative to quantitative (Bayesian) confirmation theory
This sourceSurvey arguing that Hempel's official theory of confirmation should be rejected in favour of a broadly Bayesian account.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
“we will argue that Hempel's intuitions about the paradox of confirmation were (basically) correct, and that it is his theory that should be rejected, in favor of a (broadly) Bayesian account of confirmation.”
- Philosophy of science and inductive logic — the home turf: the canonical counterexample to naive hypothetico-deductive confirmation and the motivation for moving from qualitative to quantitative (Bayesian) confirmation theory
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Registry ID ref:b9b7c87d03e3 · see in the full table