What Really Matters in Auction Design¶
Klemperer, P. (2002). What Really Matters in Auction Design. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), 169-189.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
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Primes¶
- Auction Theory
- This is auction theory in everyday commercial practice — not a Myerson-style revenue-optimization proof, but a disciplined application of the same logic to a real format-choice decision, of the kind Klemperer (2002) catalogs in his "what really matters" practitioner essay.
This sourcePractitioner essay arguing collusion-resistance and entry/participation often dominate revenue-equivalence subtleties in real format choice
- This is auction theory in everyday commercial practice — not a Myerson-style revenue-optimization proof, but a disciplined application of the same logic to a real format-choice decision, of the kind Klemperer (2002) catalogs in his "what really matters" practitioner essay.
- Idealized-Substrate Fallacy
- Mechanism design and auction theory design against frictionless honest participants who do not exist, with collusion, sniping, and budget constraints as the elided terms that bite at deployment.
This sourceShows that real auction failures arise from collusion, entry deterrence, and budget constraints — the frictions elided when mechanisms are designed against idealized honest participants.
- Mechanism design and auction theory design against frictionless honest participants who do not exist, with collusion, sniping, and budget constraints as the elided terms that bite at deployment.
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