What Really Matters in Auction Design¶
Klemperer, P. (2002). What Really Matters in Auction Design. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), 169-189.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Auction Theory
- This is auction theory in everyday commercial practice — not a Myerson-style revenue-optimization proof, but a disciplined application of the same logic to a real format-choice decision, of the kind Klemperer (2002) catalogs in his "what really matters" practitioner essay.
This sourcePractitioner essay arguing collusion-resistance and entry/participation often dominate revenue-equivalence subtleties in real format choice.
SupportedVerified against the work's full text
Klemperer contrasts revenue-equivalence theory with the competition issues that drive real auction design, then walks through actual format choices.
“However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circumstances of the recent U.K. mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal.”
- This is auction theory in everyday commercial practice — not a Myerson-style revenue-optimization proof, but a disciplined application of the same logic to a real format-choice decision, of the kind Klemperer (2002) catalogs in his "what really matters" practitioner essay.
- Idealized-Substrate Fallacy
- Mechanism design and auction theory design against frictionless honest participants who do not exist, with collusion, sniping, and budget constraints as the elided terms that bite at deployment.
This sourceShows that real auction failures arise from collusion, entry deterrence, and budget constraints — the frictions elided when mechanisms are designed against idealized honest participants.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Klemperer shows auction theory underweights collusion and entry deterrence, but treats budget constraints as already modelled and never mentions sniping.
“preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour”
- Mechanism design and auction theory design against frictionless honest participants who do not exist, with collusion, sniping, and budget constraints as the elided terms that bite at deployment.
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