Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.

Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review, 71(3), 393-410.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1981

Volume

71

Issue

3

Pages

393-410

Link

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1802787

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

4 citations across 4 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Adverse Selection
  • In credit markets, Stiglitz-Weiss

    This sourceShows banks do not clear the credit market via price because higher interest rates adversely select riskier borrowers (and induce riskier behavior), producing equilibrium credit rationing — supports the prime's credit-rationing / non-price-clearing claim.

• Moral Hazard
  • B3 dedup flag: Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
• Screening
  • showed how interest-rate menus combined with credit rationing serve as a screening device.

Domain-specific

• Credit rationing
  • Credit rationing occurs when some borrowers who are willing to obtain more credit at the prevailing quoted terms cannot do so, or are denied credit, because lenders restrict quantity rather than clearing excess demand solely by raising the interest rate.

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