The Theory of Committees and Elections¶
Black, D. (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Preference Heterogeneity and Conflict
- Their ubiquity across organizations, markets, democracies, and families indicates that heterogeneity is normal and structurally persistent, a finding Black (1958) demonstrates in his theory of committees and elections.
This sourceFoundational text on voting theory: documents that aggregation mechanisms (majority rule, single-peaked preference voting, median-voter outcomes) are ubiquitous and structurally necessary across heterogeneous-preference committees and electorates.
- Their ubiquity across organizations, markets, democracies, and families indicates that heterogeneity is normal and structurally persistent, a finding Black (1958) demonstrates in his theory of committees and elections.
Mechanisms¶
- Pairwise Option Comparison
- Intransitive Condorcet cycles can leave no undominated option at all, which feels like a defect but is really the method reporting that the question is ill-posed.
This sourceShows that pairwise majority preferences can form an intransitive cycle with no Condorcet winner.
- Intransitive Condorcet cycles can leave no undominated option at all, which feels like a defect but is really the method reporting that the question is ill-posed.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:bd8528fe16c7 · see in the full table