The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource¶
Gordon, H. S. (1954). The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery. Journal of Political Economy, 62(2), 124-142.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Resource Management
- Strategic Substitute
- Public-goods provision: every additional contributor reduces the marginal value of my own contribution; free-riding is substitutability at the welfare layer. Conservation and fisheries: when other boats fish hard, the residual stock available to me drops, and my optimal effort can rise (race to fish) or fall (give up the day) depending on cost structure.
This sourceFoundational analysis of open-access fisheries in which others' effort depletes the residual stock, shaping each actor's optimal effort — a strategic-substitution structure over a shared resource.
- Public-goods provision: every additional contributor reduces the marginal value of my own contribution; free-riding is substitutability at the welfare layer. Conservation and fisheries: when other boats fish hard, the residual stock available to me drops, and my optimal effort can rise (race to fish) or fall (give up the day) depending on cost structure.
- Tragedy of the Commons
- War Of Attrition
- The evolutionary-stable-strategy analysis of animal displays ports to market-exit analysis; auction theory's insight that all-pay equilibria dissipate the prize ports to fee-shifting law reform; the political-science framing of brinkmanship as an attrition contest ports to online-platform design, where edit-war locking, cooldown periods, and reply rate limits all convert open-ended attrition into bounded or deadlined contests; and military doctrine about attrition warfare ports to resource-extraction policy, where a poorly designed open-access fishery is a war of attrition over the stock with predictable dissipation of the resource rent.
This sourceOpen-access fishery as a dissipative competition over the stock, with rent dissipated through unrestricted entry — the resource-extraction analogue of attrition.
- The evolutionary-stable-strategy analysis of animal displays ports to market-exit analysis; auction theory's insight that all-pay equilibria dissipate the prize ports to fee-shifting law reform; the political-science framing of brinkmanship as an attrition contest ports to online-platform design, where edit-war locking, cooldown periods, and reply rate limits all convert open-ended attrition into bounded or deadlined contests; and military doctrine about attrition warfare ports to resource-extraction policy, where a poorly designed open-access fishery is a war of attrition over the stock with predictable dissipation of the resource rent.
Domain-specific¶
- Fishing Effort
- The failure mode under open-access governance — identified by Gordon (1954) as the bionomic equilibrium
This sourceGordon's economic analysis of the fishery as a common-property resource in which rents are dissipated under individualistic competition.
Supported in partVerified against a saved copy of the source
“the natural resources of the sea yield no economic rent. Fishery resources are unusual in the fact of their common-property nature”
- The failure mode under open-access governance — identified by Gordon (1954) as the bionomic equilibrium
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