Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy

Roughgarden, T. (2005). Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy. MIT Press.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

2005

Link

https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262182430/

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
  • Computer science — stability of distributed protocols against Byzantine deviators, analysis of selfish-routing equilibria, and evolutionary dynamics in multi-agent learning.

    This sourceAnalyzes selfish-routing equilibria in networks and the price of anarchy — game-theoretic equilibrium and stability analysis of distributed/selfish agents in computer science.

• Nash Equilibrium
  • The stability against unilateral deviation defines it, and crucially it need not be efficient: the equilibrium travel time can exceed the system-optimal time a central planner would assign, and the gap is the price of anarchy.

    This sourceDefines and bounds the price of anarchy — the ratio of equilibrium to optimal cost in routing games — quantifying the gap between the Nash user-equilibrium and the system optimum.

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