Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information¶
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982). Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis. Econometrica, 50(2), 443-459.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Deterrence
- And in antitrust and market entry, an incumbent threatens predatory pricing to deter entry, which works only if the threat is credible.
This sourceShows how an incumbent's pre-entry pricing can credibly deter entry only under incomplete information that makes the threat believable — the industrial-organization instance of credibility-gated deterrence.
- And in antitrust and market entry, an incumbent threatens predatory pricing to deter entry, which works only if the threat is credible.
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