The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice

Medina, J. (2011). The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary. Social Epistemology, 25(1), 15-35.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2011

DOI

10.1080/02691728.2010.534568

Link

https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2010.534568

Cited from

philosophy

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Epistemic Justice

  • This sourceArgues that credibility excess (undeserved epistemic privilege) is a complementary form of epistemic injustice that Fricker's proportional view under-theorizes. Replaces davis-2016 as the support for the T2 'credibility deficit vs. excess' inline claim.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:c045ae8c7771 · see in the full table