The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice¶
Medina, J. (2011). The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary. Social Epistemology, 25(1), 15-35.
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Primes¶
- Epistemic Justice
This sourceArgues that credibility excess (undeserved epistemic privilege) is a complementary form of epistemic injustice that Fricker's proportional view under-theorizes. Replaces davis-2016 as the support for the T2 'credibility deficit vs. excess' inline claim.
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Registry ID ref:c045ae8c7771 · see in the full table