A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems

Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1978). A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems. ACM, 21(2), 120-126.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1978

DOI

10.1145/359340.359342

Link

https://doi.org/10.1145/359340.359342

Cited from

computer_science, engineering_design, information_theory, physics, statistics_experimental_design, systems_cybernetics

Cited by

10 citations across 10 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Capability Separation
  • The forgery-prevention mechanism is the hardness of the underlying trapdoor problem — inverting the signing operation without the private key requires solving a problem believed to be intractable.

    This sourceEstablishes the trapdoor-hardness signature scheme where signing requires the private key but verification uses only the public key.

• Compression

  • This sourceThe RSA public-key cryptosystem. Tier C (bibliography only). DOI verified.

• Data Integrity
  • Failure mode: integrity protected at one layer but lost at another (verified by app but corrupted in transit; signed at source but corrupted at rest); requires holistic architecture review

    This sourceFirst practical public-key cryptosystem and digital-signature scheme; a signature verifiable by anyone establishes authenticated origin.

• Discrete vs. Continuous (Quantization)

  • This sourceThe RSA public-key cryptosystem over discrete modular arithmetic. Bibliography-only entry.

• Entropy (Thermodynamic Sense)

  • This sourceIntroduces the RSA public-key cryptosystem. Bibliography-only; not cited in the body and unrelated to entropy — likely a residual template entry.

• Measurement Uncertainty and Observational Noise
  • Listed in the references but not attached to a specific claim.
• Multiplexing
  • Listed in the references but not attached to a specific claim.
• Redundancy
  • Listed in the references but not attached to a specific claim.
• Signal Decay and Fadeout
  • Listed in the references but not attached to a specific claim.

Domain-specific

• Public-Key Cryptography
  • The security bet is visible: recovering d requires knowing φ(n), which requires factoring n back into 3 × 11 — trivial here, but for a 2048-bit n, computationally infeasible

    This sourceThe original paper states the bet in these terms — 'breaking our system by computing φ(n) is no easier than breaking our system by factoring n', and computing d is itself equivalent to factoring — though its own size recommendation is a modulus of about 200 digits, not 2048 bits.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:c08036610539 · see in the full table