Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism¶
Sugden, R. (2008). Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism. Constitutional Political Economy, 19(3), 226-248.
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Primes¶
- Mandatory vs. Default Norms
- This creates a long-running normative dispute: Conly (2013) argues that systematic cognitive limitations justify "coercive paternalism" that overrides consensual choices for the chooser's own good, while Hausman and Welch (2010) and Sugden (2008) counter that even soft, default-based nudges raise serious autonomy concerns and that incoherent or mutable preferences do not, by themselves, license third-party override.
This sourceArgues that the empirical fact that individual preferences are often incoherent or context-dependent does not, by itself, license third-party override of consensual choice; an autonomy-respecting framework must be built on something other than preference-coherence assumptions.
- This creates a long-running normative dispute: Conly (2013) argues that systematic cognitive limitations justify "coercive paternalism" that overrides consensual choices for the chooser's own good, while Hausman and Welch (2010) and Sugden (2008) counter that even soft, default-based nudges raise serious autonomy concerns and that incoherent or mutable preferences do not, by themselves, license third-party override.
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