Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics.¶
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics. The American Economic Review, 92(3), 460-501.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
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Primes¶
- Asymmetry
- Naming the privileged side and the currency of the imbalance (knowledge, power, time, access, structural position) is what points at the intervention space — rebalancing power and rebalancing information require completely different interventions even when both target the "same" asymmetry, a stance Stiglitz (2002) develops at length in his Nobel-lecture account of how information-asymmetric interventions are categorically distinct from price-or-power interventions.
This sourceSynthesis of information economics: characterizes asymmetric private information as a distributional condition that systematically distorts terms toward the informed party, unifying adverse selection, moral hazard, signaling, and screening as consequences and remedies of one structure — so that information-asymmetric interventions are categorically distinct from price- or power-based interventions.
- Naming the privileged side and the currency of the imbalance (knowledge, power, time, access, structural position) is what points at the intervention space — rebalancing power and rebalancing information require completely different interventions even when both target the "same" asymmetry, a stance Stiglitz (2002) develops at length in his Nobel-lecture account of how information-asymmetric interventions are categorically distinct from price-or-power interventions.
- Information Asymmetry
- This distributional structure systematically distorts the terms, prices, and outcomes of the interaction in favor of the better-informed party unless mechanisms intervene to compress, reveal, or align around the hidden knowledge.
This sourceSynthesis of information economics: characterizes asymmetric private information as a distributional condition that systematically distorts terms toward the informed party, unifies adverse selection, moral hazard, signaling, and screening as consequences and remedies of one structure, and frames the diagnostic question from which failure mode and remedy follow.
- This distributional structure systematically distorts the terms, prices, and outcomes of the interaction in favor of the better-informed party unless mechanisms intervene to compress, reveal, or align around the hidden knowledge.
- Opportunity Asymmetry
- The transfer between labor-market opportunity asymmetry and international-trade opportunity asymmetry is direct, mirroring the structural critique Stiglitz (2002) develops of how endowment-conditioned negotiating power shapes outcomes across both labor and trade arenas:
This sourceSynthesis of information economics: characterizes asymmetric private information as a distributional condition that systematically distorts terms toward the informed party, unifies adverse selection, moral hazard, signaling, and screening as consequences and remedies of one structure, and frames the diagnostic question from which failure mode and remedy follow.
- The transfer between labor-market opportunity asymmetry and international-trade opportunity asymmetry is direct, mirroring the structural critique Stiglitz (2002) develops of how endowment-conditioned negotiating power shapes outcomes across both labor and trade arenas:
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