Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure¶
Baumol, W. J., Panzar, & Willig, R. D. (1982). Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure. Harcourt Brace.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Economies Of Scope
- It separates two configurations — a world in which each output is produced on a dedicated base, and a world in which a single base spans the whole portfolio — and names the cost advantage of the second over the first whenever the shared base is fixed and re-usable across variety, a contrast Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) formalized through the subadditivity of the multi-output cost function.
This sourceHarcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York. Formalizes the multi-output cost function and its subadditivity (cost of the joint portfolio below the sum of stand-alone costs), establishing the separation of scale from scope as the core diagnostic of multi-product cost structure.
- It separates two configurations — a world in which each output is produced on a dedicated base, and a world in which a single base spans the whole portfolio — and names the cost advantage of the second over the first whenever the shared base is fixed and re-usable across variety, a contrast Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) formalized through the subadditivity of the multi-output cost function.
Domain-specific¶
- Barrier to Entry
- Where this asymmetry is large and durable, incumbents can sustain prices above long-run average cost (earn rents) without triggering the entry that would compete them away; where the asymmetry is absent, pricing above cost invites entry and markets are contestable even with few current competitors
Supported in partVerified against the source
- Where this asymmetry is large and durable, incumbents can sustain prices above long-run average cost (earn rents) without triggering the entry that would compete them away; where the asymmetry is absent, pricing above cost invites entry and markets are contestable even with few current competitors
Mechanisms¶
- Challenger Access Window
- But the credible threat of the open window disciplines the incumbent's pricing and service even when no one challenges
This sourceExplains that the threat of potential entry can constrain incumbent conduct even when entry does not occur.
- But the credible threat of the open window disciplines the incumbent's pricing and service even when no one challenges
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 1 of 3 citations: 1 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Was it audited? Yes. A second, independent pass read the citation against the article text and recorded a verdict.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 2 other ways.
- https://books.google.com/books/about/Contestable_Markets_and_the_Theory_of_In.html?id=hHdgAAAAIAAJ ×1
- https://books.google.com/books/about/Contestable_markets_and_the_theory_of_in.html?id=hHdgAAAAIAAJ ×1
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