Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy¶
Blinder, A. S., Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., De Haan, J., & Jansen, D. (2008). Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(4), 910-945.
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Primes¶
- Change Notification
- The salience condition bites here as it does in software — guidance issued too noisily, or reversed too often, loses the audience's attention and stops moving markets.
This sourceSurveys how central-bank communication moves markets and enhances predictability, and how noisy or frequently-reversed guidance loses market attention — the salience condition in monetary policy.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
The survey finds conflicting central-bank voices degrade predictability and the "cacophony" can leave a bank with no voice; it does not show guidance losing attention or ceasing to move markets.
“the predictability of monetary policy appears to be degraded somewhat when central banks speak with too many conflicting voices”
- The salience condition bites here as it does in software — guidance issued too noisily, or reversed too often, loses the audience's attention and stops moving markets.
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