Trust, reciprocity, and social history¶
Berg, J., Dickhaut, & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122-142.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Trust
- It identifies what must be true for trust to be warranted: trustee incentives alignment (does good behavior reward the trustee?), monitoring mechanisms (what signals reveal trustee behavior?), reputation stakes (what does the trustee lose if exposed?), exit costs (how easily can the trustor switch?), and the cost of breach to both parties—conditions Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) experimentally probe with their canonical investment-game paradigm.
This sourceIntroduces the canonical investment-game paradigm; experimentally probes the conditions—reciprocity, social history, reputation—under which costly trust is rationally extended despite incomplete monitoring.
- It identifies what must be true for trust to be warranted: trustee incentives alignment (does good behavior reward the trustee?), monitoring mechanisms (what signals reveal trustee behavior?), reputation stakes (what does the trustee lose if exposed?), exit costs (how easily can the trustor switch?), and the cost of breach to both parties—conditions Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) experimentally probe with their canonical investment-game paradigm.
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Registry ID ref:c5d9a0fe4127 · see in the full table