How Bad Is Selfish Routing?¶
Roughgarden, T., & Tardos, É. (2002). How Bad Is Selfish Routing?. Journal of the ACM, 49(2), 236-259.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Braess's Paradox
- Communication networks — added capacity in a selfishly-routed packet network can degrade end-to-end performance, studied formally under the "price of anarchy."
This sourceFormalizes the price of anarchy of selfish routing, the framework under which Braess effects in communication and traffic networks are studied.
- Communication networks — added capacity in a selfishly-routed packet network can degrade end-to-end performance, studied formally under the "price of anarchy."
- Price of Anarchy
- The ratio is finite for some game classes (linear-cost routing has price of anarchy at most 4/3) and unbounded for others.
This sourceProves the price of anarchy of selfish routing is at most 4/3 for linear latency functions, with the bound a property of the cost-function class.
- The ratio is finite for some game classes (linear-cost routing has price of anarchy at most 4/3) and unbounded for others.
Verification¶
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