Rent dissipation¶
Tullock, G. (1967). Rent dissipation.
Retired. This entry was not a citation. Our extractor stored an inline prose definition from the article as though it were a bibliographic record: the title names a concept rather than a published work, and the citation text names no work at all. The page is kept because links to it still resolve, but it is withdrawn from the reference list. This entry is kept so the citations that pointed at it still resolve, and so the correction is visible rather than silent.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Rent-Seeking Audit
- Its strength is turning a vague sense that "the system is rigged" into a sized, ranked map that distinguishes channels with a real public rationale from pure tolls — and, crucially, it surfaces the contest cost, the effort dissipated fighting over the rent that a "who benefits" analysis never sees.
This sourceThis is why the audit counts contest cost, not only the transfer.
- Its strength is turning a vague sense that "the system is rigged" into a sized, ranked map that distinguishes channels with a real public rationale from pure tolls — and, crucially, it surfaces the contest cost, the effort dissipated fighting over the rent that a "who benefits" analysis never sees.
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:c6e9796514a9 · see in the full table