Simultaneous ascending auctions¶
Cramton, P. (2006). Simultaneous ascending auctions.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Allocation
- FCC spectrum auctions and CPU scheduling, side by side: The U.S. FCC has, since 1994, allocated wireless spectrum to carriers via simultaneous multi-round auctions designed by Milgrom, Wilson, and McAfee — a mechanism-design success story studied across the regulatory-economics literature (Cramton 2006).
This sourceIn P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, & R. Steinberg (Eds.), Combinatorial Auctions (Ch. 4). MIT Press. Analysis of the FCC simultaneous multi-round (simultaneous ascending) auction design as the canonical spectrum-allocation case. SUPPORTS the FCC-spectrum-auction example. NOTE: original def gave pp. 99–114; this is Chapter 4 of the volume — page range corrected/qualified to the chapter.
- FCC spectrum auctions and CPU scheduling, side by side: The U.S. FCC has, since 1994, allocated wireless spectrum to carriers via simultaneous multi-round auctions designed by Milgrom, Wilson, and McAfee — a mechanism-design success story studied across the regulatory-economics literature (Cramton 2006).
Verification¶
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