Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design.¶
Hartline, J. D., & Karlin, A. R. (2007). Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design. Algorithmic Game Theory.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Domain-specific¶
- Bayesian Optimal Mechanism
- Under irregular distributions, virtual values must be ironed to restore allocation monotonicity.
This sourceDevelops Bayesian optimal mechanism design, virtual valuation, virtual surplus, reserve prices, and ironing in single-parameter settings.
- Under irregular distributions, virtual values must be ironed to restore allocation monotonicity.
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Registry ID ref:c7ee6df67407 · see in the full table