Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design.

Hartline, J. D., & Karlin, A. R. (2007). Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design. Algorithmic Game Theory.

Type

Book chapter

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

2007

Link

https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm/cs15-892F13/algorithmic-game-theory.pdf

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Domain-specific

• Bayesian Optimal Mechanism
  • Under irregular distributions, virtual values must be ironed to restore allocation monotonicity.

    This sourceDevelops Bayesian optimal mechanism design, virtual valuation, virtual surplus, reserve prices, and ironing in single-parameter settings.

Verification

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