The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation¶
Brunnermeier, M., Crockett, A., Goodhart, C., Persaud, A., & Shin, H. S. (2009). The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Fracture Toughness
- In financial systems capital buffers, central clearing, circuit breakers, and lender-of-last-resort facilities are explicit toughness engineering.
This sourceArgues for macroprudential regulation — capital buffers, central clearing, circuit breakers — as systemic contagion-arrest mechanisms.
- In financial systems capital buffers, central clearing, circuit breakers, and lender-of-last-resort facilities are explicit toughness engineering.
- Speculative Bubble
- Prices stalled, then collapsed, and because the loop was coupled to leverage, the reversal cascaded through the financial system, the leverage-amplified transmission Brunnermeier (2009) dissects in his account of how the liquidity-and-credit spiral turned the housing reversal into a systemic crisis.
This sourceInternational Center for Monetary and Banking Studies / CEPR. Argues that making each bank individually safe does not make the financial system safe, and that crisis-time individual prudence can undermine systemic stability — motivating the post-2008 shift to macroprudential regulation; supports the puzzle of prudent parts producing collective collapse.
- Prices stalled, then collapsed, and because the loop was coupled to leverage, the reversal cascaded through the financial system, the leverage-amplified transmission Brunnermeier (2009) dissects in his account of how the liquidity-and-credit spiral turned the housing reversal into a systemic crisis.
- Systemic Risk
- The concept crystallized in finance after the 2008 crisis, when regulators recognized that the soundness of individual banks said little about the stability of the banking network, but the same shape governs ecosystems, power grids, epidemics, and supply chains; it answers a recurring puzzle: why do systems composed of individually prudent, well-managed parts nonetheless collapse all at once?
This sourceInternational Center for Monetary and Banking Studies / CEPR. Argues that making each bank individually safe does not make the financial system safe, and that crisis-time individual prudence can undermine systemic stability — motivating the post-2008 shift to macroprudential regulation; supports the puzzle of prudent parts producing collective collapse.
- The concept crystallized in finance after the 2008 crisis, when regulators recognized that the soundness of individual banks said little about the stability of the banking network, but the same shape governs ecosystems, power grids, epidemics, and supply chains; it answers a recurring puzzle: why do systems composed of individually prudent, well-managed parts nonetheless collapse all at once?
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