Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making

Gailmard, S. (2009). Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 21(2), 161-186.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2009

DOI

10.1177/0951629808100762

Link

https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629808100762

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Domain-specific

• Multiple principal problem
  • A reference-grade claim names principals, agent, delegated action, information, contracts or controls, preference alignment, timing, and the particular failure or equilibrium result instead of treating plurality itself as proof of inefficiency.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:c95eb2fcfe43 · see in the full table