Bargaining in Legislatures¶

Baron, & Ferejohn. (1989). Bargaining in Legislatures.

Type: Unclassified
Intellectual base: Unclassified
Year: 1989
DOI: 10.2307/1961664
DOI registrant: registered by a platform that did not publish the work; the publisher is not recorded
Link: https://doi.org/10.2307/1961664

Cited by¶

1 citation across 1 artifact.

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Domain-specific¶

Pirate game
- Baron and Ferejohn (1989, American Political Science Review) formalised legislative bargaining with the same structure the pirate game caricatures: a legislator is recognised to propose a division of a fixed budget, the chamber votes by majority, and on rejection a new proposer is recognised at random (possibly the same legislator) and payoffs are discounted
  This sourceThe Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining model, in which a randomly recognised member proposes a division, the chamber votes by majority, and after a rejection a new proposer is drawn and payoffs are discounted. The equilibrium in which the recognised proposer keeps a disproportionate share and buys a bare majority by paying each partner their continuation value.
  
  SupportedVerified against the source
  
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