Continuous auctions and insider trading¶
Kyle, A. S. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, 53(6), 1315-1335.
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Primes¶
- Liquidity
- The microstructure literature operationalizes these dimensions: Kyle (1985) derived market depth and the now-standard Kyle's lambda (price impact per unit of order flow) within an equilibrium model of informed trading, while Amihud and Mendelson (1986) demonstrated empirically that bid-ask spreads carry an asset-pricing premium, formalizing the link between transaction-cost dimensions and required returns.
This sourceEquilibrium model of informed trading that derives market depth and the price-impact coefficient now known as Kyle's lambda. Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1986). Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Journal of Financial Economics, 17(2), 223–249. Empirical demonstration that bid-ask spreads carry an asset-pricing premium, formalizing the link between transaction-cost dimensions and required returns.
- The microstructure literature operationalizes these dimensions: Kyle (1985) derived market depth and the now-standard Kyle's lambda (price impact per unit of order flow) within an equilibrium model of informed trading, while Amihud and Mendelson (1986) demonstrated empirically that bid-ask spreads carry an asset-pricing premium, formalizing the link between transaction-cost dimensions and required returns.
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