Transaction-Cost Economics¶
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233-261.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Governance
- Governance codifies these relationships so individuals can act without constant referral upward and without fear of arbitrary reversal, the transaction-cost reduction that Williamson (1979) identifies as the core economic function of governance structures.
This sourceFoundational transaction-cost analysis showing that governance structures economize on negotiation and dispute-resolution costs, enabling parties to act without constant renegotiation—the transaction-cost reduction the prime attributes to governance.
- Governance codifies these relationships so individuals can act without constant referral upward and without fear of arbitrary reversal, the transaction-cost reduction that Williamson (1979) identifies as the core economic function of governance structures.
- Transaction Costs
- … negotiation); ex-post transaction costs (monitoring, enforcement, renegotiation, adjustment); market transaction costs (between arm's-length parties); hierarchical transaction costs (within firms — agency costs, bureaucratic costs, internal measurement-and-reward costs); political transaction costs (
This sourceFoundational transaction-cost analysis showing that governance structures economize on negotiation and dispute-resolution costs, enabling action without constant renegotiation.
- … negotiation); ex-post transaction costs (monitoring, enforcement, renegotiation, adjustment); market transaction costs (between arm's-length parties); hierarchical transaction costs (within firms — agency costs, bureaucratic costs, internal measurement-and-reward costs); political transaction costs (
Mechanisms¶
- Partnership Restructuring
- Its honest failure mode is the hold-up problem: once relationship-specific investment accumulates, dependence returns and the party becomes vulnerable to renegotiation even under a nominally diversified contract.
This sourceShows how relationship-specific investment creates bilateral dependence and contractual vulnerability to opportunistic renegotiation.
- Its honest failure mode is the hold-up problem: once relationship-specific investment accumulates, dependence returns and the party becomes vulnerable to renegotiation even under a nominally diversified contract.
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