Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process

Gilbert, M. D. (2006). Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process. University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 67(4), 803-870.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2006

Link

https://lawreview.law.pitt.edu/ojs/lawreview/article/view/55

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Conditional Access
  • The prime's countermeasures map directly: mandate unbundling via single-subject rules that forbid coupling unrelated matter, or improve outside options via procedures that make a clean continuing resolution available.

    This sourceExamines single-subject rules in state constitutions through public-choice theory, distinguishing logrolling from 'riding' — the structural countermeasure to omnibus coupling that forces the unbundled vote.

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