The Modern Corporation and Private Property¶
Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
Cited by¶
6 citations across 6 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Accountability
- Market accountability is decentralized and continuous (not periodic), but—as Berle and Means (1932) demonstrated in their study of separation of ownership and control—it presupposes choice, information, and mobility, conditions not met in monopolies, authoritarian contexts, or labor markets with structural unemployment
This sourceFoundational corporate-governance text documenting the separation of ownership from control in the modern publicly held corporation, with dispersed passive shareholders unable to monitor management.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Confirms Berle and Means documented the separation of ownership from control, but says nothing of market accountability's need for choice, information or mobility.
“The book's most enduring theme is the separation of ownership from control of the modern corporation and its consequences. Berle and Means display keen awareness of the divergent interests of directors and managers, and of each from owners of the firm.”
- Market accountability is decentralized and continuous (not periodic), but—as Berle and Means (1932) demonstrated in their study of separation of ownership and control—it presupposes choice, information, and mobility, conditions not met in monopolies, authoritarian contexts, or labor markets with structural unemployment
- Agency Problem
- The shareholder-manager case (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976) is the most famous and has the most developed theory, but not the only or most important one
This sourceMacmillan. Foundational corporate-governance text documenting the separation of ownership from control in the modern publicly held corporation. SUPPORTS the claim that the shareholder-manager case is the most famous, citing Berle and Means (1932).
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The publisher blurb confirms Berle and Means centre on separation of ownership and control, but says nothing on relative fame, theory development or importance.
“The book's most enduring theme is the separation of ownership from control of the modern corporation and its consequences.”
- The shareholder-manager case (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976) is the most famous and has the most developed theory, but not the only or most important one
- Checks and Balances
- Checks and balances represent a design principle asserting that authority becomes more legitimate and less prone to abuse when distributed across actors with conflicting interests and complementary veto powers, a logic Berle and Means (1932) extended from constitutional governance to the modern corporation by separating ownership (shareholders) from control (managers and directors).
This sourceFoundational corporate-governance text documenting the separation of ownership from control in the modern publicly held corporation; supplies the structural diagnosis for which subsequent governance architectures (board independence, audit oversight) are responses.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
The publisher's description of Berle and Means (1932) confirms the separation of ownership from control as the book's enduring theme, but says nothing of a logic extended from constitutional governance.
“The book's most enduring theme is the separation of ownership from control of the modern corporation and its consequences. Berle and Means display keen awareness of the divergent interests of directors and managers, and of each from owners of the firm.”
- Checks and balances represent a design principle asserting that authority becomes more legitimate and less prone to abuse when distributed across actors with conflicting interests and complementary veto powers, a logic Berle and Means (1932) extended from constitutional governance to the modern corporation by separating ownership (shareholders) from control (managers and directors).
- Conflict of Interest
- T6: Temporal Misalignment and Incentive Duration. The formal tension: a conflicted party's incentive to prioritize one interest may be strongest in the short term, while the harm to the other interest accumulates over time, the structural separation of ownership from control that Berle and Means (1932) diagnosed as endemic to the modern corporation.
This sourceFoundational corporate-governance text documenting the separation of ownership from control in the modern publicly held corporation; supplies the structural diagnosis for later governance architectures. Live-verified.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The Routledge description states the book's enduring theme is the separation of ownership from control; it says nothing about short-term incentives or accumulating harm.
“The book's most enduring theme is the separation of ownership from control of the modern corporation and its consequences.”
- T6: Temporal Misalignment and Incentive Duration. The formal tension: a conflicted party's incentive to prioritize one interest may be strongest in the short term, while the harm to the other interest accumulates over time, the structural separation of ownership from control that Berle and Means (1932) diagnosed as endemic to the modern corporation.
- Separation of Powers
- Separation of powers in corporations manifests as separation between ownership (shareholders), governance (board), management (executive), and audit/oversight—a layered architecture whose foundational diagnosis Berle and Means (1932) supplied in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, where the dispersion of shareholding from operational control was first systematically theorized as the structural problem corporate governance must solve.
This sourceFoundational corporate-governance text documenting the separation of ownership from control in the modern publicly held corporation; supplies the structural diagnosis for which subsequent governance architectures (board independence, audit oversight) are responses.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Publisher's description confirms Berle & Means' enduring theme is the separation of ownership from control; it does not state a four-layer corporate separation of powers.
“The book's most enduring theme is the separation of ownership from control of the modern corporation and its consequences.”
- Separation of powers in corporations manifests as separation between ownership (shareholders), governance (board), management (executive), and audit/oversight—a layered architecture whose foundational diagnosis Berle and Means (1932) supplied in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, where the dispersion of shareholding from operational control was first systematically theorized as the structural problem corporate governance must solve.
Domain-specific¶
- Paradox of Voting (Downs Paradox)
- National and sub-national elections — the canonical application and empirical anchor, where p is on the order of one in millions and observed 50-to-80-percent turnout exceeds what the bare instrumental calculus predicts. Shareholder proxy voting in widely-held corporations — the dispersed owner's habitual apathy about returning a non-pivotal proxy is the turnout analogue Berle and Means documented, though the decisiveness calculus applied to it postdates them by a quarter-century
This sourceBerle and Means's account of the widely-held corporation, in which ownership is dispersed and separated from control and the normal apathy of the small stockholder leaves his proxy unreturned or signed over to management - the turnout analogue the bullet names.
SupportedVerified against the source
- National and sub-national elections — the canonical application and empirical anchor, where p is on the order of one in millions and observed 50-to-80-percent turnout exceeds what the bare instrumental calculus predicts. Shareholder proxy voting in widely-held corporations — the dispersed owner's habitual apathy about returning a non-pivotal proxy is the turnout analogue Berle and Means documented, though the decisiveness calculus applied to it postdates them by a quarter-century
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 6 of 6 citations: 1 supported, 5 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.
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