Theories of economic regulation¶
Posner, R. A. (1974). Theories of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 5(2), 335-358.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Primes¶
- Regulatory Capture
- The regulator begins with a public mandate (protect consumers, ensure safety, prevent monopoly); regulated entities possess superior information, resources, or access; they leverage these advantages to shape the regulator's priorities, standards, or enforcement focus; the regulator's decisions begin to serve private interests at the expense of public ones, a sequence Posner (1974) traces in his synthesis of capture theories.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Posner's article treats capture theory and argues regulation can serve producer/coalition interests at public expense, but does not trace the claim's mandate-to-capture sequence.
“Much regulation, I argued, may be the product of coalitions between the regulated industry and customer groups, the former obtaining some monopoly profits from regulation, the latter obtaining lower prices (or better service) than they would in an unregulated market——all at the expense of unorganized, mostly consumer, groups.”
- The regulator begins with a public mandate (protect consumers, ensure safety, prevent monopoly); regulated entities possess superior information, resources, or access; they leverage these advantages to shape the regulator's priorities, standards, or enforcement focus; the regulator's decisions begin to serve private interests at the expense of public ones, a sequence Posner (1974) traces in his synthesis of capture theories.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:d0807bea6998 · see in the full table