Counterfactuals¶
Lewis, D. K. (1973). Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press.
Cited by¶
7 citations across 7 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Causality
- Abstract reasoning about causation also reveals its isomorphism to other structures in formal systems: the use of counterfactuals mirrors possible-world semantics in modal logic, the causal graph mirrors Bayesian networks in probabilistic inference, and the recursion between belief and behavior in causal learning mirrors reinforcement-learning value updates.
This sourceDevelops the counterfactual conditional as a variably strict conditional quantifying over the most similar accessible possible worlds; the similarity-ordering fixes a modal claim's meaning.
- Abstract reasoning about causation also reveals its isomorphism to other structures in formal systems: the use of counterfactuals mirrors possible-world semantics in modal logic, the causal graph mirrors Bayesian networks in probabilistic inference, and the recursion between belief and behavior in causal learning mirrors reinforcement-learning value updates.
- Counterfactuals
- Lewis (1973)
This sourceDevelops counterfactual conditionals as quantification over the most similar accessible worlds; the similarity-based accessibility relation fixes a counterfactual's truth (true iff the consequent holds in the nearest antecedent-worlds). Verified support for the possible-worlds analysis, Lewis-vs-Stalnaker multiple-world semantics, and the causation-as-counterfactual-dependence claims.
- Lewis (1973)
- Minimal Modification Principle
- When constructing counterfactual scenarios—imagining alternative worlds where a condition is false—a fundamental principle constrains which alternatives are legitimate: preserve as many true facts as possible about the actual world while varying only the antecedent condition, as Lewis (1973) systematized in his closest-possible-worlds analysis of counterfactuals.
This sourceFoundational treatment of counterfactual conditionals via closest-possible-worlds semantics: a counterfactual is true when its consequent holds at the antecedent-worlds most similar to actuality, formalizing the requirement to preserve actual facts while varying only the antecedent.
- When constructing counterfactual scenarios—imagining alternative worlds where a condition is false—a fundamental principle constrains which alternatives are legitimate: preserve as many true facts as possible about the actual world while varying only the antecedent condition, as Lewis (1973) systematized in his closest-possible-worlds analysis of counterfactuals.
- Modal Reasoning
- The decisive theoretical ingredient is the accessibility relation: a specification of which alternatives count as "live" from a given vantage point, and it is this relation — rather than the operator alone — that fixes what the modal claim means, a point Lewis (1973) makes central in his analysis of counterfactual conditionals as quantification over the most similar accessible worlds.
This sourceDevelops counterfactual conditionals as quantification over the most similar accessible worlds; the similarity-based accessibility relation (not the operator alone) fixes a modal claim's meaning, evaluates the non-actual as non-actual, and underlies both legal but-for causation and the hidden-accessibility-relation character of apparently factual disputes.
- The decisive theoretical ingredient is the accessibility relation: a specification of which alternatives count as "live" from a given vantage point, and it is this relation — rather than the operator alone — that fixes what the modal claim means, a point Lewis (1973) makes central in his analysis of counterfactual conditionals as quantification over the most similar accessible worlds.
- Time
- This requires treating time as a variable dimension along which one can imagine variations, the formal framework Lewis (1973) developed by analyzing counterfactual conditionals as comparisons across closest possible worlds branching at a given temporal index.
This sourceDevelops counterfactual conditionals as quantification over the most similar accessible worlds; the similarity-based accessibility relation (not the operator alone) fixes a modal claim's meaning, evaluates the non-actual as non-actual, and underlies both legal but-for causation and the hidden-accessibility-relation character of apparently factual disputes.
- This requires treating time as a variable dimension along which one can imagine variations, the formal framework Lewis (1973) developed by analyzing counterfactual conditionals as comparisons across closest possible worlds branching at a given temporal index.
Mechanisms¶
- Closest-World Ranking Table
- Its deep limitation is that there is no single, objective similarity metric — closeness among possible worlds is famously underdetermined, and which respects of similarity matter is a genuine judgment, not a fact.
This sourceTreats possible-world closeness as context-sensitive and underdetermined by any single objective similarity metric, requiring judgment about which respects matter.
- Its deep limitation is that there is no single, objective similarity metric — closeness among possible worlds is famously underdetermined, and which respects of similarity matter is a genuine judgment, not a fact.
- Counterfactual Minimal-Change Checklist
- Keeping the alternative minimal and nearby is exactly the closest-possible-world discipline that makes counterfactual claims evaluable at all.
This sourceEvaluates counterfactuals by the closest possible worlds in which the antecedent holds, ordered by similarity to the actual world.
- Keeping the alternative minimal and nearby is exactly the closest-possible-world discipline that makes counterfactual claims evaluable at all.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 7 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 3 other ways.
- https://philpapers.org/rec/LEWC-2 ×1
- https://philpapers.org/rec/LEWC-3 ×1
- https://search.worldcat.org/title/Counterfactuals/oclc/795075 ×1
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