An Economic Theory of Democracy¶
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Majority-Dominated Aggregate Objective
- Politics and voting — majoritarian or plurality rules underweight intense minority preferences; median-voter dynamics drive policy toward the centre of mass.
This sourceDevelops the median-voter logic, in which majoritarian competition drives policy toward the center of the voter distribution and underweights intense minority preferences.
- Politics and voting — majoritarian or plurality rules underweight intense minority preferences; median-voter dynamics drive policy toward the centre of mass.
Domain-specific¶
- Paradox of Voting (Downs Paradox)
- The paradox of voting (Downs 1957; Tullock 1967; Riker and Ordeshook 1968) is the rational-choice puzzle that turnout in large elections is observed to be substantially higher than instrumental-rationality models predict
This sourceDowns's An Economic Theory of Democracy, the origin of the instrumental calculus of voting and of the observation that it predicts near-universal abstention in a large electorate.
- The paradox of voting (Downs 1957; Tullock 1967; Riker and Ordeshook 1968) is the rational-choice puzzle that turnout in large elections is observed to be substantially higher than instrumental-rationality models predict
Verification¶
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
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