Co-ordination and Lock-In¶
Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007). Co-ordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects. Handbook of Industrial Organization.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Lock-In
- Farrell and Klemperer (2007) develop a similar decomposition in their survey of switching costs and network effects, using it to identify when policy intervention can dissolve a lock without destroying the value the lock protects.
This sourceComprehensive survey of switching-cost and network-effect economics; decomposes lock-in into diagnosable components and identifies policy leverage points (interoperability mandates, data-portability requirements) that can dissolve a lock without destroying the value the lock protects.
- Farrell and Klemperer (2007) develop a similar decomposition in their survey of switching costs and network effects, using it to identify when policy intervention can dissolve a lock without destroying the value the lock protects.
Mechanisms¶
- Switching-Cost Scaffold
- Aggressive switching costs breed resentment, invite regulation
This sourceShows that switching costs and lock-in invite competition-policy and antitrust scrutiny, including interventions intended to open inefficient lock-in.
- Aggressive switching costs breed resentment, invite regulation
Verification¶
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Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 2 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.
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Registry ID ref:d3e5a3bb7184 · see in the full table