The Concept of Mind¶
Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Implicit Knowledge
- the substrate of tacit knowing that Polanyi termed "we know more than we can tell," encoded in body schema, procedural memory, pattern recognition rather than in propositions; (3) the apprenticeship-transmission requirement
This sourceHutchinson. Ryle Concept of Mind know-how versus know-that apprenticeship transmission.
- the substrate of tacit knowing that Polanyi termed "we know more than we can tell," encoded in body schema, procedural memory, pattern recognition rather than in propositions; (3) the apprenticeship-transmission requirement
Mechanisms¶
- Ontology Alignment Session
- Its failure mode is the category mistake: treating two concepts as the same kind of thing
This sourceDefines category mistakes as conflating items that belong to different logical types or categories.
- Its failure mode is the category mistake: treating two concepts as the same kind of thing
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.
Registry ID ref:d495b4a3c577 · see in the full table