Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada¶
Force, U. S. –. P. S. O. T. (2004). Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Cascade
- Electrical engineering: A tripped transmission line redistributes its load onto neighboring lines, which now exceed their own ratings and trip in turn, shedding their load further outward — a cascading blackout that sweeps a grid in minutes.
This sourceU.S. Department of Energy / Natural Resources Canada. Official investigation tracing how a single sagging Ohio transmission line, masked by a software failure, cascaded through load redistribution and relay tripping into a regional blackout affecting roughly 50 million people.
SupportedVerified against the work's full text
The Task Force report traces line outages overloading parallel circuits, which tripped in sequence and spread a blackout across the northeast in about seven minutes.
“A series of line outages in northeast Ohio starting at 15:05 EDT caused heavy loadings on parallel circuits, leading to the trip and lock-out of”
- Electrical engineering: A tripped transmission line redistributes its load onto neighboring lines, which now exceed their own ratings and trip in turn, shedding their load further outward — a cascading blackout that sweeps a grid in minutes.
- Single Point of Failure
- In power infrastructure, a single substation or transmission corridor whose failure cascades through the grid is the canonical case.
This sourceDocuments how localized substation/line failures and a software/monitoring failure cascaded into a grid-wide blackout — the canonical power-infrastructure single-point/cascade case.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
The report documents a grid-wide cascade started by a few initiating events, but attributes it to four groups of causes rather than one substation or corridor as a single point of failure.
“by just a few initiating events, as was seen on August 14”
- In power infrastructure, a single substation or transmission corridor whose failure cascades through the grid is the canonical case.
- Systemic Risk
- Engineering: A single failed node triggers cascading blackouts across an interconnected power grid, as overloaded lines trip protective relays that shift load onto adjacent lines, which then overload in turn — the 2003 Northeast blackout propagated from one Ohio transmission line to 55 million people.
This sourceU.S. Department of Energy / Natural Resources Canada. Official investigation tracing how a single sagging Ohio transmission line cascaded through load redistribution and relay tripping into a regional blackout affecting roughly 50 million people; supports the power-grid cascading-blackout example.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
The report supports relay-driven load-shifting cascade from Ohio, but gives about 50 million affected and a series of line outages, not one failed line and 55 million.
“age affected an area with an estimated 50 million”
- Engineering: A single failed node triggers cascading blackouts across an interconnected power grid, as overloaded lines trip protective relays that shift load onto adjacent lines, which then overload in turn — the 2003 Northeast blackout propagated from one Ohio transmission line to 55 million people.
Verification¶
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