Marktform und Gleichgewicht¶
von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Springer.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Credible Commitment
- Choice-set restriction over preference modification: when the present self distrusts the future self, altering the available choice set is structurally cleaner than relying on the future self's preferences, which is the formal heart of time-inconsistency analysis. Observability and verifiability: credibility requires common knowledge of the constraint, not merely its existence, because a hidden commitment cannot deter — the constraint must be visible to the party whose action it is meant to influence, which gives the prime a signal-design sub-structure. The cost-of-defection wedge: the minimal abstract requirement is a gap between the comply and renege payoffs at the execution moment large enough to flip the future self's best response, a wedge that can be physical, reputational, legal, or institutional. Counter-commitment and timing: when multiple parties commit, the strategic question becomes who can commit first and how commitments interact, which is the Stackelberg-leader structure.
This sourceIntroduces the leader-follower (Stackelberg) model in which committing first confers strategic advantage.
- Choice-set restriction over preference modification: when the present self distrusts the future self, altering the available choice set is structurally cleaner than relying on the future self's preferences, which is the formal heart of time-inconsistency analysis. Observability and verifiability: credibility requires common knowledge of the constraint, not merely its existence, because a hidden commitment cannot deter — the constraint must be visible to the party whose action it is meant to influence, which gives the prime a signal-design sub-structure. The cost-of-defection wedge: the minimal abstract requirement is a gap between the comply and renege payoffs at the execution moment large enough to flip the future self's best response, a wedge that can be physical, reputational, legal, or institutional. Counter-commitment and timing: when multiple parties commit, the strategic question becomes who can commit first and how commitments interact, which is the Stackelberg-leader structure.
Verification¶
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