The Structure of Science¶
Nagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. Harcourt, Brace.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Correspondence Principle
- The correspondence principle operates effectively regardless of which interpretation is correct, but it does not settle the metaphysical question.
This sourceCanonical statement of inter-theoretic reduction (derivation of a higher-level theory from a lower one) and the reduction-vs-emergence debate; supports the heuristic-vs-ontological / reductionism-vs-emergence framing of T6 (D13-109).
- The correspondence principle operates effectively regardless of which interpretation is correct, but it does not settle the metaphysical question.
- Reductionism
- The essential commitment is upward determination plus explanatory sufficiency: understand the parts and their composition, and nothing about the whole is left unexplained.
This sourceHarcourt, Brace & World. Classic statement of reduction as upward determination plus explanatory sufficiency, formalizing inter-theoretic reduction (the derivation of a higher-level theory from a lower one) and framing the question of where explanation bottoms out.
- The essential commitment is upward determination plus explanatory sufficiency: understand the parts and their composition, and nothing about the whole is left unexplained.
Verification¶
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