Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory.

Myerson, R. B. (2007). Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory. Mechanism Design Theory.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2007

Link

https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/myerson_lecture.pdf

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Domain-specific

• Bayesian Optimal Mechanism
  • Incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and feasibility delimit what expected surplus can be captured.

    This sourceAuthoritative accounts of incentive compatibility, the revelation principle, Bayesian equilibrium, and mechanism-design scope.

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/advanced-economicsciences2007-2.pdf ×1

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