Functions¶
Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophical Review, 82(2), 139-168.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Teleology
- Yet etiological grounding dissolves this paradox: the past selection history that shapes current structure is mechanistically backward-looking even though the function is future-oriented in conception. Not narrative purpose-attribution. Telling a historical narrative as having been "leading somewhere" can be teleological, but teleology per se does not require historical narrative; it is a form of functional explanation. Not animism or anthropomorphism without warrant. Attributing goals to non-agents is anthropomorphism; careful teleology, on Wright's (1973) etiological account, can attribute function without attributing intention (the heart has a function; it does not want to pump).
This sourceWright etiological account of biological functions selected-for-effects.
- Yet etiological grounding dissolves this paradox: the past selection history that shapes current structure is mechanistically backward-looking even though the function is future-oriented in conception. Not narrative purpose-attribution. Telling a historical narrative as having been "leading somewhere" can be teleological, but teleology per se does not require historical narrative; it is a form of functional explanation. Not animism or anthropomorphism without warrant. Attributing goals to non-agents is anthropomorphism; careful teleology, on Wright's (1973) etiological account, can attribute function without attributing intention (the heart has a function; it does not want to pump).
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