Functions

Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophical Review, 82(2), 139-168.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1973

Volume

82

Issue

2

Pages

139-168

DOI registrant

registered by a platform that did not publish the work; the publisher is not recorded

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/2183766matched

Cited from

philosophy

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Teleology
  • Yet etiological grounding dissolves this paradox: the past selection history that shapes current structure is mechanistically backward-looking even though the function is future-oriented in conception. Not narrative purpose-attribution. Telling a historical narrative as having been "leading somewhere" can be teleological, but teleology per se does not require historical narrative; it is a form of functional explanation. Not animism or anthropomorphism without warrant. Attributing goals to non-agents is anthropomorphism; careful teleology, on Wright's (1973) etiological account, can attribute function without attributing intention (the heart has a function; it does not want to pump).

    This sourceWright etiological account of biological functions selected-for-effects.

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