Charity Auctions¶
Engers, M., & McManus, B. (2007). Charity Auctions. International Economic Review, 953-994.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Auction Theory
- In charitable giving, the choice between silent auction (sealed-bid, first-price style), live auction (English ascending), and pledge-matching structures has documented effects on total donation revenue and donor satisfaction, as Engers and McManus (2007) demonstrate in their analysis of charity-auction format performance.
This sourceTheoretical and empirical analysis of charity-auction format choice (first-price, second-price, all-pay) and its effects on donation revenue and participation.
- In charitable giving, the choice between silent auction (sealed-bid, first-price style), live auction (English ascending), and pledge-matching structures has documented effects on total donation revenue and donor satisfaction, as Engers and McManus (2007) demonstrate in their analysis of charity-auction format performance.
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