The Microeconomics of Market Failures¶
Salanié, B. (2005). The Microeconomics of Market Failures. MIT Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Screening
- Where the structure transfers: in online lending platforms, loan menus with various interest-rate / collateral / reporting combinations induce borrower self-selection; riskier borrowers accept higher rates for looser covenants, lower-risk borrowers accept covenants for lower rates, and very-high-risk borrowers are screened out entirely by credit-score floors.
This sourceComprehensive treatment of screening mechanisms, adverse selection, moral hazard, and their interactions in real-world markets.
- Where the structure transfers: in online lending platforms, loan menus with various interest-rate / collateral / reporting combinations induce borrower self-selection; riskier borrowers accept higher rates for looser covenants, lower-risk borrowers accept covenants for lower rates, and very-high-risk borrowers are screened out entirely by credit-score floors.
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Registry ID ref:d909f4a7b3fe · see in the full table