11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information¶
Kuhn. (1953). 11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Domain-specific¶
- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
- The resulting strategy profile is the unique SPE when the game is finite, has perfect information, and lacks payoff ties at terminal nodes (a result modern textbooks often call Zermelo's theorem, although Zermelo's 1913 paper on chess neither states it nor uses backward induction; the pure-strategy existence result for general perfect-information games is Kuhn's, 1953)
This sourceKuhn's theorem that every finite game of perfect information has an equilibrium in pure strategies, generalising the Zermelo-von Neumann theorem.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- The resulting strategy profile is the unique SPE when the game is finite, has perfect information, and lacks payoff ties at terminal nodes (a result modern textbooks often call Zermelo's theorem, although Zermelo's 1913 paper on chess neither states it nor uses backward induction; the pure-strategy existence result for general perfect-information games is Kuhn's, 1953)
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