Software Protection and Simulation on Oblivious RAMs.¶
Goldreich, O., & Ostrovsky, R. (1996). Software Protection and Simulation on Oblivious RAMs. Journal of the ACM, 431-473.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Side Channel Attack
- That reframing licenses interventions the access-policy frame cannot generate — constant-time implementations, oblivious memory access, output rate limiting, padding, response normalization, randomized delays, decoy traffic, query-pattern obfuscation
This sourceIntroduces oblivious RAM, making memory-access patterns independent of the data accessed — a foundational defense that decouples an observable (access pattern) from protected state, exemplary of the side-channel defense family (constant-time code, ORAM, padding, response normalization, cover traffic).
- That reframing licenses interventions the access-policy frame cannot generate — constant-time implementations, oblivious memory access, output rate limiting, padding, response normalization, randomized delays, decoy traffic, query-pattern obfuscation
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:dcfa6cc57c26 · see in the full table