Regulatory Arbitrage.¶
Fleischer, V. (2010). Regulatory Arbitrage. Texas Law Review, 89(2), 227-289.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Brandolini's Law
- Regulation — a regulated party can propose evasive interpretations and loopholes faster than a regulator can audit and close them.
This sourceProvides the first comprehensive theory of regulatory arbitrage — parties restructure deals to exploit gaps between economic substance and regulatory treatment faster than regulators can respond — evidencing the loophole-versus-audit cost asymmetry.
- Regulation — a regulated party can propose evasive interpretations and loopholes faster than a regulator can audit and close them.
Mechanisms¶
- Regulatory Boundary Review
- Its failure mode is degrading into a rubber stamp — a box-ticking exercise that finds a technical "yes" while violating the rule's purpose
This sourceDefines regulatory arbitrage as restructuring around a gap between a deal’s economic substance and its regulatory treatment to reduce or avoid regulatory burdens.
- Its failure mode is degrading into a rubber stamp — a box-ticking exercise that finds a technical "yes" while violating the rule's purpose
Verification¶
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
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