A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance¶
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Approach-Avoidance Conflict
- Not procrastination as such: procrastination has multiple causes (executive-function weakness, temporal discounting); approach-avoidance is one specific gradient structure that can produce delay, not the delay itself. Not static ambivalence: approach-avoidance is a dynamic gradient model; static ambivalence is the co-existence of incompatible attitudes without gradient-proximity dependence.
This sourceHolds that incompatible cognitions produce an aversive tension motivating change; cited as the contrast case of static (non-gradient) ambivalence.
- Not procrastination as such: procrastination has multiple causes (executive-function weakness, temporal discounting); approach-avoidance is one specific gradient structure that can produce delay, not the delay itself. Not static ambivalence: approach-avoidance is a dynamic gradient model; static ambivalence is the co-existence of incompatible attitudes without gradient-proximity dependence.
- Belief Formation
- Social psychology: Conformity-driven belief change (Asch lines, Sherif autokinetic effect), group polarization, in-group testimony privilege, dissonance reduction as a driver of belief formation, and the social-identity contingency of doxastic assent, a regime Festinger (1957) formalized in his theory of cognitive dissonance as a motivational engine for retroactive belief-fixation.
This sourceAgents experience aversive tension from incompatible cognitions and reduce it through belief change, selective exposure, or reinterpretation
- Social psychology: Conformity-driven belief change (Asch lines, Sherif autokinetic effect), group polarization, in-group testimony privilege, dissonance reduction as a driver of belief formation, and the social-identity contingency of doxastic assent, a regime Festinger (1957) formalized in his theory of cognitive dissonance as a motivational engine for retroactive belief-fixation.
- Cognitive Dissonance
- At least two active cognitions. Two or more mutually accessible cognitive elements — beliefs, attitudes, memories of recent action, self-concepts — are simultaneously present to the person.
This sourceFoundational theory: inconsistent cognitions create aversive tension that motivates reduction via belief change, selective exposure, or reinterpretation.
- At least two active cognitions. Two or more mutually accessible cognitive elements — beliefs, attitudes, memories of recent action, self-concepts — are simultaneously present to the person.
- Confirmation Bias
- .
This sourceFoundational theory that inconsistent cognitions produce aversive tension motivating belief change, selective exposure, or reinterpretation — the motivational source blended with the cognitive sources of confirmation bias. Live-verified (Stanford UP).
- .
- Dissonance
- Two beliefs about unrelated topics are different; "I value honesty" held together with "I lied to my friend" is dissonant.
This sourceInconsistency between beliefs, or belief and behavior, generates aversive pressure resolved by revising belief, behavior, or self-image — the cognitive specialization of the general prime.
- Two beliefs about unrelated topics are different; "I value honesty" held together with "I lied to my friend" is dissonant.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 2 other ways.
- https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=3850 ×2
- https://www.sup.org/books/sociology/theory-cognitive-dissonance ×1
Registry ID ref:df2523871ce8 · see in the full table