The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.¶
Krueger, A. O. (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. American Economic Review, 64(3), 291-303.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Rent Seeking
- It enables reasoning about the institutional-design problem: any rule that creates a rent creates a constituency for its preservation, including against evidence that the rent is socially destructive, which is why captured agencies are hard to reform.
This sourceCoins "rent-seeking" and shows competition for import licences and artificial scarcity consumes real resources and entrenches its beneficiaries.
- It enables reasoning about the institutional-design problem: any rule that creates a rent creates a constituency for its preservation, including against evidence that the rent is socially destructive, which is why captured agencies are hard to reform.
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