Discovering Prices¶
Milgrom, P. (2017). Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints. Columbia University Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Auction Theory
- The 2016-17 Incentive Auction that repacked broadcast TV spectrum for wireless use combined a reverse auction (buying spectrum from broadcasters) with a forward auction (selling to wireless carriers) and a combinatorial repacking optimization — a mechanism-design and auction-theory tour de force
This sourceDevelops the auction/mechanism design used in the FCC incentive auction; supports the inline citation. [tier B / inline]
- The 2016-17 Incentive Auction that repacked broadcast TV spectrum for wireless use combined a reverse auction (buying spectrum from broadcasters) with a forward auction (selling to wireless carriers) and a combinatorial repacking optimization — a mechanism-design and auction-theory tour de force
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:e0064ee6c8d9 · see in the full table