Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care.¶
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. American Economic Review, 53(5), 941-973.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
Mechanisms¶
- Accountability-Link Audit
- The named hazard underneath is moral hazard: when an inflow insulates an actor from the consequences of poor performance, the incentive to perform decays even while the capability to perform is still intact.
This sourceExplains moral hazard as reduced incentives for care or performance when insurance or another arrangement shields an actor from the consequences of their choices.
- The named hazard underneath is moral hazard: when an inflow insulates an actor from the consequences of poor performance, the incentive to perform decays even while the capability to perform is still intact.
- Secondary-Capacity Reserve Activation
- A guaranteed backstop can also breed moral hazard
This sourceExplains moral hazard as the change in incentives and behavior produced when insurance shifts or cushions risk.
- A guaranteed backstop can also breed moral hazard
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