On War¶
Clausewitz, C. v., & Howard. (1976). On War. Princeton University Press.
Cited by¶
9 citations across 9 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Center Of Gravity
- Military strategy (origin): the enemy's army, capital, alliance, or public will;
This sourceEdited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976 (orig. 1832). Originates the Schwerpunkt / center of gravity as the source of an adversary's power whose disruption decides the contest — the enemy's army, capital, alliance, or public will.
- Military strategy (origin): the enemy's army, capital, alliance, or public will;
- Culminating Point
- The pattern's home is military operations, where Clausewitz named the Höhepunkt des Sieges — Napoleon's advance to Moscow in 1812, the Wehrmacht's reach toward Stalingrad in 1942, imperial Japanese expansion to Guadalcanal, each a victory that beyond a point became its own undoing.
This sourceEdited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976 [orig. 1832]. Originates the culminating point of victory (Höhepunkt des Sieges) in Book VII, ch. 22: the point past which an offensive's continued advance destroys the advantage it built.
- The pattern's home is military operations, where Clausewitz named the Höhepunkt des Sieges — Napoleon's advance to Moscow in 1812, the Wehrmacht's reach toward Stalingrad in 1942, imperial Japanese expansion to Guadalcanal, each a victory that beyond a point became its own undoing.
- Mass
- Military strategy. Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time; concentration moves and the dual failure of being concentrated against (defeat in detail) are the offense and defense of the same insight.
This sourceEdited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976 (orig. 1832). Articulates concentration of force (Schwerpunkt) at the decisive point and the dual danger of defeat in detail.
- Military strategy. Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time; concentration moves and the dual failure of being concentrated against (defeat in detail) are the offense and defense of the same insight.
Domain-specific¶
- Attrition Trap
- . Clausewitzian culminating-point analysis — the discipline's own backward-compatible theory of the point beyond which continued offensive consumption no longer advances the strategic aim
This sourceThe Maud translation of On War, whose chapter on the culminating point of the attack describes the point at which the attacking force is exhausted and the defensive reaction begins.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“the chapter on the culminating point of victory”
- . Clausewitzian culminating-point analysis — the discipline's own backward-compatible theory of the point beyond which continued offensive consumption no longer advances the strategic aim
- Culmination Surprise
- The concept is Clausewitz's (On War, Book VII, Chapter 5: "The Culminating Point of the Attack"): the attacker's strength relative to the defender degrades continuously as the attack deepens, and there is a specific operational moment beyond which further advance is no longer rational even though nothing visible has yet gone wrong.
This sourceClausewitz's chapter 'The Culminating Point of the Attack' (On War, Book VII, ch. 5), where the force of an attack diminishes as it deepens and the attacker's remaining strength comes to suffice only for defence.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“it is possible in tire course of the attack for superiority to increase, but usually it will be reduced”
- The concept is Clausewitz's (On War, Book VII, Chapter 5: "The Culminating Point of the Attack"): the attacker's strength relative to the defender degrades continuously as the attack deepens, and there is a specific operational moment beyond which further advance is no longer rational even though nothing visible has yet gone wrong.
Mechanisms¶
- Flanking Maneuver
- Its failure mode is overreach past the culminating point: a flank that pushes too far outruns its support, exposes its own flank in turn, and is destroyed by the counter it invited — Clausewitz's culminating point of the attack, where advancing further makes you weaker, not stronger.
This sourceDefines the culminating point of attack beyond which continued advance reverses advantage and makes the attacker progressively weaker.
- Its failure mode is overreach past the culminating point: a flank that pushes too far outruns its support, exposes its own flank in turn, and is destroyed by the counter it invited — Clausewitz's culminating point of the attack, where advancing further makes you weaker, not stronger.
- Focused Vertical Launch
- Military strategy calls this deliberate massing of strength at one decisive point the Schwerpunkt.
This sourceUses Schwerpunkt for a center or point of concentrated effort and recommends concentrating force against the decisive center rather than dispersing it.
- Military strategy calls this deliberate massing of strength at one decisive point the Schwerpunkt.
- Reach Limit Gate
- It is the operational form of Clausewitz's culminating point: the reach beyond which an advance grows weaker, not stronger.
This sourceEdited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret. Princeton University Press (1976). Defines the culminating point as the stage beyond which a continuing advance exhausts the attacker's advantage and leaves the offensive weaker.
- It is the operational form of Clausewitz's culminating point: the reach beyond which an advance grows weaker, not stronger.
- Terrain or Topology Position Review
- The military notion of a center of gravity — the source from which a system's structure derives its cohesion and strength — captures why reading topology before acting matters: advantage concentrates where the structure says it does, not where the surface looks impressive.
This sourceTreats center of gravity as a military-strategic notion locating where force, connection, and dependence concentrate.
- The military notion of a center of gravity — the source from which a system's structure derives its cohesion and strength — captures why reading topology before acting matters: advantage concentrates where the structure says it does, not where the surface looks impressive.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 9 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 4 other ways.
- https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691018546/on-war ×2
- https://search.worldcat.org/title/On-war/oclc/2428983 ×2
- https://www.google.com/books/edition/On_War/Tg5MEAAAQBAJ ×1
- https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7svzz ×1
Registry ID ref:e1aa043418d7 · see in the full table