On Thought Experiments

Norton, J. D. (2004). On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the Argument?. Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.

Type

Conference paper

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2004

Link

https://sites.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/papers/TE_Blackwell_2004.pdf

Cited from

philosophy

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Primes

• Thought Experiment
  • Gendler argues that reasoning about particular imagined entities can sometimes justify a conclusion in a way not captured by merely restating the initial information as a straightforward argument. Norton defends the competing view that the epistemic force comes from an argument presented in a vivid form.

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