Coordination Games¶
Cooper, R. (1999). Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Coordination
- Consensus implies agreement on goals; coordination can align actors with conflicting goals (a traffic light coordinates vehicles going in different directions), a separation Cooper (1999) formalizes in his game-theoretic treatment of pure coordination versus mixed-motive equilibria.
This sourceGame-theoretic treatment distinguishing pure coordination, mixed-motive games, and consensus problems; formalizes how coordination apparatus aligns actors with potentially conflicting goals without requiring shared motivation.
- Consensus implies agreement on goals; coordination can align actors with conflicting goals (a traffic light coordinates vehicles going in different directions), a separation Cooper (1999) formalizes in his game-theoretic treatment of pure coordination versus mixed-motive equilibria.
- Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Selection
- The problem is not how to motivate cooperation—agents want to coordinate—but which equilibrium to select when many are equally rational, a class of pure-coordination games systematically catalogued by Cooper (1999).
This sourceGame-theoretic treatment cataloguing pure-coordination and mixed-motive games; systematizes the class of games where agents want to coordinate but face multiple equally rational equilibria.
- The problem is not how to motivate cooperation—agents want to coordinate—but which equilibrium to select when many are equally rational, a class of pure-coordination games systematically catalogued by Cooper (1999).
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