Coordination Games¶
Cooper, R. (1999). Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Coordination
- Consensus implies agreement on goals; coordination can align actors with conflicting goals (a traffic light coordinates vehicles going in different directions), a separation Cooper (1999) formalizes in his game-theoretic treatment of pure coordination versus mixed-motive equilibria.
This sourceGame-theoretic treatment distinguishing pure coordination, mixed-motive games, and consensus problems; formalizes how coordination apparatus aligns actors with potentially conflicting goals without requiring shared motivation.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The book's own abstract confirms a game-theoretic treatment of coordination games and coordination problems, but does not state the pure-coordination-versus-mixed-motive distinction the claim attributes to it.
“The initial sections of the book cover the basic framework of complementarities and provide a discussion of the experimental evidence on the outcome of coordination games.”
- Consensus implies agreement on goals; coordination can align actors with conflicting goals (a traffic light coordinates vehicles going in different directions), a separation Cooper (1999) formalizes in his game-theoretic treatment of pure coordination versus mixed-motive equilibria.
- Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Selection
- The problem is not how to motivate cooperation—agents want to coordinate—but which equilibrium to select when many are equally rational, a class of pure-coordination games systematically catalogued by Cooper (1999).
This sourceGame-theoretic treatment cataloguing pure-coordination and mixed-motive games; systematizes the class of games where agents want to coordinate but face multiple equally rational equilibria.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Cooper's abstract confirms the book covers coordination games and coordination problems, but it is a macroeconomics monograph on complementarities, not a catalogue of pure-coordination games.
“The initial sections of the book cover the basic framework of complementarities and provide a discussion of the experimental evidence on the outcome of coordination games.”
- The problem is not how to motivate cooperation—agents want to coordinate—but which equilibrium to select when many are equally rational, a class of pure-coordination games systematically catalogued by Cooper (1999).
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 2 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:e2ee9d47dbb2 · see in the full table