Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria.¶
Cho, I., & Kreps, D. M. (1987). Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 179-221.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Signaling
- address the multiplicity of equilibria in signaling games and select the most "reasonable" separating equilibrium under plausible beliefs about off-path behavior.
This sourceFoundational refinement of equilibrium selection in signaling games via the intuitive criterion.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Cho & Kreps (1987) supplies the multiplicity-of-equilibria problem and the restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs that eliminates unintuitive equilibria; it does not supply the Banks-Sobel D1 criterion named in the same claim.
“By restricting those out-of-equilibrium beliefs, one can sometimes eliminate many unintuitive equilibria. We present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and Mertens' notion of stability.”
- address the multiplicity of equilibria in signaling games and select the most "reasonable" separating equilibrium under plausible beliefs about off-path behavior.
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